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Monitoring Motherhood
Whitter v. State, No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
[A pregnant woman's] suffering is too intimate and personal for the
state to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role,
however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history
and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large
extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her
place in society.'
In Whitner v. State,2 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of Cornelia Whitner for criminal child neglect for taking cocaine
during her pregnancy. The court explained that "the word 'child' as used in
[the state's child abuse] statute includes viable fetuses."3 The first state court
of last appeal to uphold such a conviction, the South Carolina court declined
to engage the policy implications of its decision' and refused to address the
constitutional repercussions on rights ranging from liberty to due process to the
right to procreate to sex and race equality.5 This Case Note argues that by
failing to recognize the unique relationship that exists between a pregnant
woman and her fetus, the Whitner court forged a policy that will redound to
the detriment of women.
Cornelia Whitner's son was born with cocaine metabolites in his system;
at trial, Whitner admitted that she took cocaine during the third trimester of her
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
2. No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
3. Id. at *2.
4. See id. at * 12-14 (insisting court will address only facts at hand. not policy concerns of dcfcndant)
5. The Whimier court found that none of the constitutonal issues were raised on appeal See iad at "24
For a full discussion of the constitutional fights implicated by cases like Whimer. sc:, for example.
Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women
Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505. 526-45 (1992); Lynn M. Paltrow. When Becoming Pregnant is
a Crime, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41. 44 (1990); Dorothy E. Roberts. Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color Equality and the Right of Priacy. 104 HARV. L REV 1419. 1462-81 (1991).
and Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Comment, Prosecution of Mothers of DrugEsposed Babies
Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 505. 508-21 (1990)-
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pregnancy.6 Writing for a majority of the court, Associate Justice Jean Toal
found that it was consistent with the intent of the South Carolina legislature
and with the purpose of the state child abuse statute to include viable fetuses
within the meaning of the word "person" and, therefore, within the purview of
the statute.7 "South Carolina law," the court wrote, "has long recognized that
viable fetuses are persons holding certain legal rights and privileges."8
Many state courts have previously considered whether women can be
convicted for taking cocaine while pregnant.9 As the Whitner court itself
recognized, however, no other state court of last appeal has upheld such a
conviction.'0 In support of its holding, the Whitner court cited state
precedents upholding wrongful death claims involving viable fetuses" as well
as criminal prosecutions for feticide against parties other than the mother.1
2
The court argued that it would be "absurd" in light of these cases not to
recognize a viable fetus as a person for purposes of the child abuse statute.'
3
The court also appealed to the United States Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence to support its argument that the state has a compelling interest
6. See Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *3. Whitner pleaded guilty to child neglect before the circuit
court. After she was imprisoned, she sought postconviction relief claiming that the circuit court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to accept her plea and that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The postconviction relief court reversed her conviction on both grounds and the state appealed. See id.
7. The version of the statute under which Whitner was charged states:
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless person, who shall ... refuse or
neglect to provide.. . the proper care and attention for such child or helpless person, so that
the life, health or comfort of such child or helpless person is endangered or is likely to be
endangered, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished.
Id. at *5-6 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law Co-op. 1985)).
8. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
9. Women have been prosecuted under two theories. First, they have been charged under drug laws
for delivering cocaine to a fetus. Such cases turn on courts' deciding whether "delivery" encompasses
ingesting cocaine during pregnancy and do not require courts to reach the question of whether a fetus is
a person because the "delivery" is said to occur after the child's birth, but before the umbilical cord is cut.
State appellate courts have rejected this theory. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fla.
1992); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 52-53
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990). Second, pregnant women have been charged under child abuse statutes. Until
Whitner, all state appellate courts had overturned such convictions. See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court, 141
Cal. Rptr. 912, 915 (Ct. App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Ky. 1993); Sherriff
v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 598 (Nev. 1994); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ohio 1992).
10. See Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *14-15.
11. See id. at *6-8 (discussing Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964) (applying wrongful
death statute to mother whose viable fetus was not born alive); Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960)
(applying wrongful death statute to mother whose infant died after birth because of prenatal injuries)). But
cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (arguing that tort action appears "to vindicate the parents'
interests and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of
life").
12. See Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *8-9 (discussing State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C.
1984) (recognizing crime of feticide under murder statute)). Not all courts agree that feticide can be
recognized under homicide statutes. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
13. See Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *9. The court, however, ignores the fact that at common
law a woman was exempt from criminal liability for aborting her fetus, in recognition of her right to control
her own body, even if third parties were not. See JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA 20-45 (1978);
see also, e.g., State v. Carey, 56 A. 632, 636 (Conn. 1904) ("At common law an operation on the body of
a woman quick with child, with the intent thereby to cause her miscarriage, was an indictable offense, but
it was not an offense in her to so treat her own body .... ) (emphasis added).
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in the life of a viable fetus. 4 Finally, the court rejected Whitner's contention
that South Carolina precedent supported recognizing fetal rights only when
such recognition would protect a parent's interest in the fetus, rather than a
state interest.1 5 The court refused to "insulate[] the mother from all culpability
for harm to her viable child .... [T]he rationale underlying our body of law
[is the] protection of the viable fetus."' 
6
Far from protecting fetuses, however, prosecutions such as Whitner's may
actually be harmful to fetal health. Faced with the prospect of criminal
liability, for example, many drug-using women will simply avoid prenatal care
for fear of detection.' 7 Others might choose to abort rather than risk
imprisonment." This problem is compounded by the fact that the threat of
liability after Whitner is not limited to cocaine use. As the dissent pointed out,
the court's opinion "render[s] a pregnant woman potentially criminally liable
for myriad acts which the legislature has not seen fit to criminalize."' 9
Furthermore, the child abuse statute, as construed by the Whither court,
does not even require that the woman's actions actually harm her fetus for her
to be liable.20 It merely requires that her actions are "likely to endanger" the
fetus. 2' Given the diversity of views on the panoply of activities that have the
14. See Whither, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120. at *19 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 505 U S. 833
(1992); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113. 165
(1973)). The Whitner court ignored Roe's explicit statement that "the word *person.' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." 410 U.S. at 158. The state interest defined in Casey
is one in the "potentiality of human life," 505 U.S. at 879. not in a 'person."
15. See Whirner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *18.
16. Id. at *20. This is a dubious claim. As the dissent states. "'[The failure of the legislature on eleven
occasions to pass proposed bills addressing the problem of drug use dunng pregnancy is evidence the child
abuse and neglect statute is not intended to apply in this instance." Id. at "30 (Moore, J.. dissenting).
17. See CENTER FOR REPROD. LAW & POuCY, PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING
PREGNANCY 11 (1996) (noting opposition of American Medical Association. American Academy of
Pediatrics, American Nurses Association, American Public Health Association, among others, to prosecuting
pregnant women because such prosecutions might cause women to avoid prenatal care).
18. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 1445. For advocates of fetal rights, aborton is obviously not an
acceptable solution; it is the greatest possible harm. Policies that focus on drug treatment and addiction
prevention would protect the fetus without the adverse consequences that may follow the Whtmer holding.
19. Whimer, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at 031-32. The court itself recognized this possibility. See id. at
*13-14 (stating that it would not be absurd to prosecute parents for legal acts that potenually endanger
viable fetus). Women have already been prosecuted for child abuse for engaging in a variety of legal
activities while pregnant. See Paltrow, supra note 5, at 43 (describing prosecutions of pregnant women for
activities such as drinking alcohol and having sex against doctor's advice); Don Terry. In Wisconsin. a
Rarity of a Fetal-Harm Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1996, at A6 (discussing Wisconsin case in which
woman was charged with attempted homicide for drinking excessively in hours before giving birth).
20. In fact, as the Whimer court itself conceded, see 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120. at *14. the effects of
cocaine on a fetus are not clear. See, e.g., Linda C. Mayes et al., The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine
Exposure: A Rush to Judgment, 267 JAMA 406,406 (1992) ("Available evidence from the newbom penod
is far too slim and fragmented to allow any clear predictions about the effects of intrauterine exposure to
cocaine on the course and outcome of child growth and development."). Cornelia \Vhitner's son is now a
healthy eight-year old boy whose mother has already spent 19 months in prison and will now serve an
additional eight-year sentence. See Robin Abcarian, A New Strategy for Pregnancy Police?. LA. TIMES.
Sept. 18, 1996, at El.
21. Whiner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *5-6 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law Co-op. 1985)).
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potential to harm a woman's fetus, from smoking22 to eating the wrong
23foods, pregnant women are constantly vulnerable to prosecution under the
Whitner court's theory.2' The court also ignored the racial implications of this
increased vulnerability: Black women have been and are likely to be the
primary targets of such prosecutions.25
The Whitner holding thus represents a substantial incursion into the liberty
interests of pregnant women, and therefore of all potentially pregnant
women,26 in South Carolina. As such, Whitner evokes a history of judicial
attempts to control the behavior of pregnant women and the practice of
motherhood. 27 Courts have long sought to regulate motherhood, invoking the
language of fetal protection to impose a duty on a woman to curtail her
choices in the name of protecting her fetus.28 As Reva Siegel points out,
"[i]mposing this duty on the pregnant woman seems reasonable because we
assume that mothers should live 'for' their children; the argument acquires its
persuasive force from unarticulated assumptions about the maternal role."2 9
22. One of the official Surgeon General's official warnings on cigarettes states: "Smoking By Pregnant
Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and low Birth Weight."
23. See, e.g., ARLENE EISENBERG Er AL., WHAT To EAT WHEN YOU'RE EXPECTrING 189-98 (1986).
24. See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 736-37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing
range of activities that could harm fetus and dismissing charges against defendant for child abuse for taking
heroin while pregnant). The potentially enormous breadth, and corresponding potential for selective
enforcement, of the Whitner holding may render the statute, as interpreted by the Whitner court,
unconstitutionally vague. Cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (holding
vagrancy ordinance void for vagueness because of lack of notice and resulting unfettered police discretion).
25. See Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Women's
Liberty, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 569, 576-606 (1992) (discussing statistical evidence that black women are
primary targets of such prosecutions); Roberts, supra note 5, at 1421 (arguing that prosecutions of poor
black women for their behavior while pregnant is punitive policy that punishes them for making
reproductive choices and reflects racist attitudes of authorities).
26. Since a woman's behavior before conception or before knowledge of conception can affect the
health of the fetus she is carrying, fetal protection policies affect all fertile women. See Kary Moss,
Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 278, 288-89 (1990). The fetal protection
policy in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., for example, which the Supreme Court held violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, excluded all women "capable of bearing children" not only from any "jobs
involving lead exposure," but also from any job "which could expose them to lead through the exercise
of job bidding, bumping, transfer or promotion rights." 499 U.S. 187, 192 (1991) (emphasis added).
Note that men are socially defined as nonparents. In Johnson Controls, for example, one male plaintiff
had been denied a leave of absence that he had requested in order to lower his lead level because he wished
to become a father. See id. at 192. Similarly, although there is scientific evidence that male cocaine use
can affect a fetus, no man has ever been prosecuted for child abuse on these grounds. For a scientific study
suggesting that male cocaine use affects fetal development, see Ricardo A. Yaziki et al., Demonstration
of Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human Spermatozoa, 266 JAMA 1956 (1991).
27. See generally Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992) (analyzing how courts have
reasoned historically about women's maternal obligations using physiological language about women's
bodies).
28. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) ("[A]s healthy mothers are essential to
vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order
to preserve the strength and vigor of the race."); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1989), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991). See generally Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal
Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219 (1986) (examining history of fetal protection policies and
their legality under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
29. Siegel, supra note 27, at 342 n.33 1.
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These unarticulated assumptions draw upon a range of moral and social
intuitions about how mothers should behave and what they should sacrifice for
their children. These assumptions then shape people's intuitions about how a
pregnant woman should behave in order to deliver a healthy child. This
transitive reasoning is possible through the equation of the role of a mother
and that of a pregnant woman and the corollary equation of proper maternal
behavior with proper gestational behavior. These are the highly suspect
equations without which the Whither court could not have applied a child
abuse statute to a woman's "treatment" of her fetus in utero.
By defining the "plain meaning of the word person"' ° to include a fetus,
the South Carolina court treated a fetus as a separate person unconnected to the
woman within whom it exists.3 Under this interpretation of the child abuse
statute, the relationship between a future mother and her fetus is categorically
indistinguishable from other custodial relationships. 32 This categorization
denies the uniqueness of the relationship between a pregnant woman and her
fetus: Unlike any other relationship, the fetus is physically situated in its
entirety inside a woman.33 As the Illinois Supreme Court observed in
dismissing a tort claim brought on behalf of a fetus against its mother: "[T]he
whole life of the pregnant woman ... impacts on the development of the
fetus.... [T]he mother's every waking and sleeping moment ... shapes the
prenatal environment which forms the world of the fetus. That this is so is not
a pregnant woman's fault: it is a fact of life." '
Given this unique relationship, there is a logical gap in the transitive
reasoning by which the Whitner court ascribed to a fetus the childhood right
of protection from potential endangerment and ascribed to a pregnant woman
the duties of motherhood. In this logical gap lies a critical distinction between
moral intuitions and legal rights. The Whitier court, like many individuals,
displays strong moral intuitions about how a pregnant woman should behave:
She should take seriously her responsibility to the fetus growing within her and
subjugate her desires for its benefit. Not every form of admirable behavior,
however, gives rise to another's legal right to that behavior. Conversely, not
every instance of socially reprehensible behavior corresponds to an
infringement of another's rights.35 It is not socially admirable behavior to take
30. Whittier v. State, No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at °9. °22 (S.C. July 15. 1996)-
31. In the court's scenario, the fetus and woman are not merely unconnected. they arc in a combatic
relationship. For a critique of this "adversarial model," see Johnsen, supra note 25. at 576-606
32. Theirs is the generic relationship described, in statutory language, as: "[alny person having the
legal custody of any child or helpless person.'" Whimer. 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120. at "5 (quoting S C CODE
ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law Co-op. 1985)).
33. The Whimer court argued that if it were to interpret the statute differently. "there %ould be no
basis for prosecuting a woman who kills her viable fetus by stabbing it. by shooting it. or by other such
means." Id. at *20. This argument ignores that a woman cannot stab or shoot her fetus without stabbing
or shooting herself, a fact that should alter dramatically the cour's image of the ruthless murderess.
34. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (ill. 1988).
35. Judith Jarvis Thomson describes two brothers, one of whom has been given a box of chocolates
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cocaine while pregnant. Unfortunately, however, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has granted fetuses a broad set of rights as a legal panacea to a social
problem. Far from a panacea, the court's solution ignores the costs to women
of creating such rights. As Nancy Rhoden has argued in discussing forced
Cesarean sections, "[i]t is far better that some tragic private wrongs transpire
than that state-imposed coercion of pregnant women become part of our legal
landscape.36
For women, the Whitner decision spells the loss of the autonomy and
liberty to make personal behavioral choices. As a society, we allow people the
autonomy to choose to act in ways that might jeopardize their well-being.37
We also recognize that "[ilt is a promise of the Constitution that there is a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter., 38 Whitner
could signify the end of this liberty interest for women in South Carolina who
are now bound by the court's vision of motherhood, one that constructs
pregnant women as mothers with obligatory moral responsibilities.39 The
danger of this vision is that when women are viewed first and foremost as
mothers, the social roles available to them are restricted. As Kristin Luker
argues, "when personhood is bestowed on the embryo, women's
nonreproductive roles are made secondary to their reproductive roles.... [A
woman] is defined by the fact that she is-or may become-pregnant."40
When this occurs, a woman risks imprisonment for following "her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society."'"
-Ariela R. Dubler
There he sits, stolidly eating his way through the box, his small brother watching enviously.
Here we are likely to say "You ought not to be so mean. You ought to give your brother some
of those chocolates." My own view is that it just does not follow from the truth of this that the
brother has any right to any of the chocolates. If the boy refuses to give his brother any, he is
greedy, stingy, callous-but not unjust.
Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 60 (1971).
36. Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans,
74 CAL. L. REv. 1951, 1953 (1986); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S, 833, 850 (1992)
(stating, in upholding woman's right to abortion, "[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code").
37. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body .... ).
The Whitner court might argue that a pregnant woman's autonomy is constrained by the fetus inside her.
As the Whitner dissent points out, however, a woman in South Carolina can abort a viable fetus in order
to preserve her health. See 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *32 n.l (Moore, J., dissenting). This indicates at least
some recognition of a woman's autonomy, and suggests that a woman's relationship to her fetus differs
from her relationship to an independent person in a critical way: Clearly a woman in South Carolina may
not kill a person in order to preserve her health; she can, however, abort her viable fetus.
38. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (1992).
39. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Dorothy Roberts argues that social constructions
of motherhood, which are both patriarchal and racist, devalue and discourage black motherhood at the same
time that they attempt to compel white motherhood. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy In the
Meaning of Motherhood, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
MOTHERHOOD 224, 229-32 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995).
40. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 200 (1984).
41. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (1992).
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